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EQUITABLE EASEMENTS.
The term "equitable easements " indicates a class of property rights, analogous to legal easements, but by reason of
either informality in their creation, or the absence of privity of
contract or estate, not enforceable in a court of law.
In considering the distinction between legal and equitable
easements, it is to be observed that, in most cases, particularly
those which relate to real property, courts of equity have
generally endeavored that their decisions should bear the
strictest possible analogy to the decisions of courts of law in
cases of a similar or corresponding impression. In relation to
estates and rights in lands, there scarcely is a rule of law or
equity of a more ancient origin, or which admits of fewer exceptions, than the rule that equity follows the law, Co. Lit. L. 3,
C. 8, sec. 504, n. 16; Cushing v. Blake, (879), 3 Stew. Eq.

(N. J.), 695.
An easement is a right without profit, in the land of another.
A profit a prendre, is a right to take or sever something valuable from the land of another; and this distinguishes it from
easements, which are rights merely to use, or interfere with the
enjoyment of another's property. In the case of an easement
there must be both a dominant and a servient tenement. The
benefit must be private, irrevocable, and unattended with direct
tangible profit. The burden must be imposed upon corporeal
property, not upon the person of the owner, and must be either
positively, or cnsequentially, injurious to its enjoyment.
Incident to its existence, are the right of the owner of the
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servient tenement to use the locus in quo, in every respect not
interfering with the easement, and the duty of the owner of
the dominant tenement to repair and amend. Such easements
are acquired by grant, by prescription, and in rare cases of
necessity, by implication of law.
In the case of easements created by covenant, or reservation, the distinction between legal and equitable easements is
not always observed. To constitute a grant of an easement at
law, it is not necessary that the word " grant" should be used
in the deed; it is sufficient if the intention to grant be manifested. An easement cannot strictly be made the subject either
of exception or reservation in a deed of conveyance of land,
for it is neither parcel of the land granted, nor does it issue
out of the land. If,therefore, an easement be incorrectly
reserved to the grantor, or excepted from the land conveyed,
the reservation or exception operates as a grant of a newly
created easement by the grantee of the land to the grantor.
Godd. Eas'mt. io8. So, an agreement under seal, for the use
of a way, or of the water of a stream for the purposes of irrigation, will be construed as a grant of an easement, and not
merely as a covenant: Lord MVoun Joy's case (1584), Moo. 174;
HJolns v. Seller (1692), 3 Lev. 305 ; Northan v. Hurley (853),
I E. & B. 665; S.c. 22 L. J. Q. B. 183. This subject is discussed in a recent case in Massachusetts, Hogan v. Barry
(1887), 143 Mass. 538. It was an action of tort, for interfering
with an easement, which the plaintiff claimed by virtue of the
following words, inserted after the description, and before the
Ihabendumz, in the conveyance to him:
"And said grantors agree that no building shall be erected on said lot next east
of said granted premises, nearer to the wvest line of said lot than four feet being
the east line of the premises hereby conveyed."

The grantor owned the adjoining land referred to and subsequently conveyed it to the defendant. The learned judge
said :
"If the seeming covenant is for a present enjoyment of a nature recognized by
the law as capable of being conveyed and made an easement ;-capable, that is to
say, of being treated as ajus in rem, and as not merely the subject of a personal
undertaking;-and if the deed discloses that the covenant is for the benefit of
adjoining land conveyed at the same time, the covenant must be construed as a
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grant, and in the language of Plowden, 308, ' the phrase of speech amounts to theeffect to vest a present property in you.' An easement I will be created and
attached ' to the land conveyed, and will pass with it, to assigns, whether mentioned in the grant or not:" Nrorcross v. James (I885), 140 Mass. x88.

Over easements of this class, courts of law and of equity
exercise concurrent jurisdiction. An action for damages will
lie, or after the establishment of the legal right and the fact of
its violation, the complainant will be entitled to a permanent
injunction, to prevent the recurrence of the wrong, unless there
be something special in the circumstances of the case.
An equitable easement is a right without profit which the
owner of land has acquired by contract, or estoppel, to restrict,
or regulate, for the benefit of his own property, the use and
enjoyment of the land of another: Whitney v. Union Ry. Co.
(1858), 11 Gray, (Mass.) 359. These rights, as well as the
remedies for their enforcement, are purely equitable, and, as
has been said, owing either to the informality of the agreement, or the relative situation of the parties, cannot be recognized in a court of law.
In their nature, easements of this class must be restrictive of
the ordinary proprietary rights, but their exact scope -it is
difficult to define. In the most usual cases, they either prohibit, or regulate, the erection of buildings, or prescribe the
purposes for which real property shall or shall not be used:
Coles v. Sims (1854), 5 De G. M. & G. I.; Western v. Macdermott (1866), L. R. I Eq. 499. Thus, courts of equity will
restrain the erection of houses on land agreed to be kept open
as a park: Hills v. Mliler (1832), 3 Paige (N. Y.) 254; Lenningv. The Ocean City Ass'n (I886), 14 Stew. Eq. (N.J.) 606; the erection of buildings above a designated height: Jeffries v.
Jeffries (1875), 117 Mass. 184; Clark v. Martin (1865), 49 Pa.
289; interference with prospect, by projection of a structure
beyond a specified line: Jenks v. Williams (1874), 115 Mass.
217; will enforce compliance with a uniform building plan:
Trnstees of Columbia College v. Lytch (1877), 70 N. Y. 440;
will protect the right of passage, light and aii, in an open
court: Salisbury v. Andrews (188o), 128 Mass. 336; will
enforce a covenant against certain employments on the granted
premises: Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. (1858), II Gray, (Mass.)
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359; Rolls v. Miller (1884), L. R. 27 Ch. D. 71; Richards v.
Revitt (1877), L. R. 7 Ch. D. 224; Portman v. Home Hospital
Ass'n M. R. Dec. I, 1879, 27 Ch. D. 8I n; or even against
nuisances in general: Barrowv. Riclard(184o),8 Paige, (N. Y.)
351. In short, the doctrine has been laid down, that any
restriction in the manner of using land granted, beneficial to
adjacent land of the grantor, not contrary to public policy,
may be enforced in equity against the grantee, or his assigns
with notice: Whilney v. Union Ry. Co. (1858), II Gray, (Mass.)
359. In the absence of a legal* remedy, relief is granted in
equity, to give effect to the intention of the parties to the
agreement.
METHODS OF CREATING EQUITABLE EASEMENTS.

The principal difference between a legal and an equitable
easement, is in the method of its creation, and the circumstances under which the right can be enforced.
Equitable easements are in general created upon the division and conveyances in severalty of an entire tract to different
grantees, and may be by reservation, by condition annexed to
the grant, by covenant or by informal agreement: Trustees of
Columbia College v. Lynck (1877), 70 N. Y. 445.
By Covenant or Reservation.-The enforcement in equity, of
,easements created by covenant, or reservation, extends to cases
where the covenant does not run with the land so as to be enforceable at law. This has been settled only after some conflict of authority. In Keppell v. Bailey (1834), 2 M. & K. 517,
-certain land owners and owners of iron works, and among
others, the lessees of the Beaufort Iron Works, formed a joint
stock company, and under the provisions of the Monmouthshire Canal Act, constructed a railroad connecting a lime
-quarry with the several iron works. In the partnership deed
of the railroad company, the lessees of the Beaufort Iron
Works covenanted for themselves and their successors in interest, to procure all the limestone used in their works from the
said quarry, and to convey all such limestone, and also all the
iron stone, from the mines to the said works along the said
railroad, at a certain designated toll. A bill was filed by the
share holders of the railroad to enforce this covenant against
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a purchaser of the Beaufort Iron Works with notice of the
partnership deed. The injunction was denied, on the ground
that the covenant did not run with the land. Lord Chancellor
BROUGHAM said" It appears to me very clearly that the covenant does not run with the land,
and therefore is not binding upon the assignees of the [covenantors] * * * * *
Between the estates of the occupiers of the three iron works, and the estates or
the persons of their associates in the railway speculation, with whom they covenant, there is no privity, no connection whatever, of which the law can take
notice * * * . There can be no harm in allowing the fullest latitude to men in
binding themselves and their representatives, that is, their assets, real and personal, to answer in damages for breach of their obligations. This tends to no.
mischief, and is a reasonable liberty to bestow; but great detriment would arise,
and much confusion of rights, if parties were allowed to invent new modes of
holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements
a peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands, however remote.
Every close, every messuage, might thus be held in a several fashion; and it would
hardly be possible to know what rights the acquisition of any parcel conferred, or
what obligations it imposed."

Keppell v. Bailey has been overruled by. Tulk v. .Moxhay
(i848), 2 Phil. 774, where the rule as now accepted, was first
established. In Tulk v. Moxzay, the plaintiff,being the owner
in fee of a vacant piece of ground in Leicester Square, as well
as of several of the houses forming the square, sold the vacant
lot to one Ems in fee, taking in the deed of conveyance a
covenant from Ems for himself, his heirs and assigns, with the
plaintiff, his heirs, executors and administrators, that the said
piece of ground should be kept and maintained in sufficient
and proper repair as a pleasure ground, in an open state, uncovered by any buildings, in neat and ornamental order. In
granting an injunction to enforce the covenant against a purchaser with notice, Lord Chancellor, COTTENHAM used this
language"It is said that, the covenant being one which does not run with the land, this
Court cann6t enforce it; but the question is, not whether the covenant runs with
the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which
he purchased. Of course, the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing couldbe more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to
sell the property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee
being allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken. That
the question does not depend upon whether the covenant runs with the land, is
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evident from this, that if there were a mere agreement and no covenant, this Court
would enforce it against aparty purchasing with notice of it; for if an equity is
attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that
,equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased."

To the same effect, Bleeker v. Bingham (1832) 3 Paige (N.
Y.) 246; Barrow v. Richards (I84o), 8 Id. 351 ; Coles v. Sims
(1854), 5 De G. M. & G. I, and cases cited in note (2); Whatinan v. Gibson (I838), 9 Sim. 196; Lord Manners v. Johnson
(1875), L. R. I Ch.Div. 673; EarlofZetlandv.Hislop (1882),
L. R. 7 App. Cas. 427; Gaskin v. Balls (1879), L. R. 13 Ch.
Div. 324; Trustees, &c., v. Lynch (I877), 70 N. Y.44o; Hodge,
Ex'r, et al., v. Sloan (887), 107 Id. 244; St. Andrew's
Lutheran Church's Appeal (I87 I), 67 Pa. 512; Wilson v. Hart
(1866), L. R. I Ch.463. These covenants may be said to run
with the land in equity, though not in law.
An exception to the rule, that the covenant need not run
with the land at law, is made in those cases in which the
promise under seal calls for the performance of some positive
act on the land, either of covenantor or covenantee. Thus in
Austerberry v. The Corporationof Oldham (885), L. R. 29 Ch.
D. 75o, a number of the inhabitants of the borough, being desirous of constructing a new road, executed a deed of settlement, which recited that the making of the proposed new road
would be of great public advantage; tliat the several parties
thereto had agreed to form amongst themselves a joint stock
company and to raise capital for the purchase of land for the
formation of the road and making and maintaining the same,
and that certain trustees had been appointed to carry. out the
work in accordance with a plan therein minutely described.
The trustees purchasedfrom one Elliott, the plaintiff's predecessor in title, a strip of land in the line of the proposed turnpike, at the same time covenanting for themselves, their heirs
and assigns, that they, or some one of them would, within
three years, make and fence off, in a workmanlike manner, the
said tract of land into a road, to form part of the road provided
for in the deed of settlement, and to form the remainder of
said road, which, when completed, should be kept open and
maintained by the said trustees for the use of the public, subject to such tolls as should be agreed upon. Undera Borough
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Improvement Act, the defendant purchased the said road, gave
notice to the plaintiff to repair the portion on which his property fronted, and upon refusal, proceeded to make the repairs
itself An attempt was made to collect the expenses from the
plaintiff, who filed a bill praying inter alia, an injunction restraining the defendants from further prosecution. The injunction was refused. Lord Justice COTTON said"In my opinion, if this is not a covenant running at law, there can be no relief
in respect of it in equity; it is not a restrictive covenant; it is not a covenant
restraining the corporation, or the trustees, from using the land in any particular
-way. If either the trustees or the corporation were intending to divert this land
from the purpose for which it was conveyed, that is, from its being used as a road
,or street, that would he a very different question. * * * But here the covenant,
-which is attempted to be insisted upon, * * is a covenant to lay out money in
.doing certain work upon this land; and, that being so, * * * it is not a covenant
,which a court of equity will enforce; it will not enforce a covenant not running
at law, when it is sought to enforce that covenant in such a way as to require the
successors in title of the covenantor, to spend money, and in that way to under(take a burden upon themselves. The covenantor must not use the property for a
purpose inconsistent with the use for which it was originally granted; but, * * *
a court of equity does not and ought not to enforce a covenant, binding only in
equity, in such a way as to require the successors of the covenantor himself,-they
"having entered into no covenant-to expend sums of money in accordance with
-what the original covenantor bound himself to do."

The rule is now firmly established, that the court will not
,enforce, against the grantee of the covenantor, who has himself entered into no covenant, any covenant of his grantor in
relation to the premises conveyed, which does not run with
the land and which requires the expenditure of money: More-'
land v. Cook (I868), L. R. 6 Eq. 252 ; Haywood v. Brunswick
Building Society (I88I), 8 Q. B. D. 403 ; London & Souzwestirn Railway Companyv. Gomm (i88i), L. R. 20 Ch. D. 562..
Huling v. Chester (1885), 19 Mo. App. 607, though an action
;at law, illustrates the distinction between covenants creating
easements and covenants which can only be enforced where
there is privity of contract. Huling and W. R. Chester, being
the owners of adjoining lots,. by agreement under seal, provided for the erection of a line wall by Huling, and for payment for half of such wall by Chester, within six months from
the date of the agreement, or at his option, by himself or his
grantees, when he or they built upon the premises using the
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part of the wall standing thereon. Prior to his death, Hulingplaced the line wall as agreed, one half on the W. R. Chester
lot. C. M. Chester, the defendant, purchased the lot from W.
R. Chester, with notice of the contract, and erected a building
on the lot, using the party wall. This action was brought by
the heirs of Huling to recover the cost of one half of the wall.
The court held that the plaintiffs could maintain an action for
any interference with their enjoyment of the easement in the
party wall, but could not, as owners of the Huling lot, maintain an action for the compensation which was to be paid to
Huling personally. The right being personal to Huling, upon
his death went to his personal representatives.
There is a class of cases in which equity grants relief by
compelling the expenditure of money in the performance of
the covenant, but in these cases the remedy is sought against
the original covenantor, and relief is granted by way of specific.
performance, and is regulated by principles affecting that branch
of equitable jurisdiction. Of this class of cases, Randall v.
Latlzam (1869), 36 Conn. 48, is an example. In that case, the
complainant claimed, a right, under one Thomas, to the water
from a raceway. Thomas and the respondent, Latham, who
was the original covenantor, were respectively the owners of
mills on the same stream. Thomas conveyed to Latham a
tract of land adjoining the mill of the latter. The deed contained a reservation that the grantor should have the privilege
of drawing water from the ditch of Latham's mill, and that
Latham and his successors should keep a spout ten inches
square in the inside at the bottom of the ditch, to which the
grantor should at all times have access' for the purpose of
drawing water. The ditch was never owned by Thomas, and
he had no interest in it, beyond that acquired by this provision
in his deed to Latham. The Court sustained the complainant's.
bill, saying"The deed purports to require the respondent to put in the spout upon land not
conveyed, and the question is whether a couit of equity can compel him to do it
under the circumstances of the case. That the respondent, by accepting the deed.
containing the provision, thereby agreed to perform this duty, there can be no
doubt. This duty was a part of the consideration of his deed. The respondent
has received full compensation, and it is difficult to see why he is not bound to
perform it."
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In the case of easements created by reservation, courts of
equity are more liberal than courts of law. On technical
grounds, there is doubt whether at law, a reservation in a deed
of conveyance, will create an easement in other lands of the
grantee than the lands granted and conveyed to him. In
equity there is no embarrassment on this subject. Thus, in
Case v. Haight (1829), 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 632; S. c. i Paige
(N. Y.) 447, Schuyler owned the south side of the lower falls
in the outlet of Lake George, and also the land under the bed
of the stream. Deals and Nichols were the owners of the
lands on the north shore, and to them he made a grant of the
bed of the stream, reserving to himself, his heirs and assigns,
the right to abut any dam, or dams, on both sides or shores
of the said waters. An injunction was granted to restrain a
breach of the covenant. In construing this reservation, SUTHERLAND, J., said"The reservation

can have no effect as an exception. *

*

* *

The deed of

Schuyler did not convey, or profess to convey, any part of the north shore; he
could not therefore reserve a right to build a dam against it. But, though void as
an exception, the reservation is binding upon the grantees and their assigns, and
becomes operative either as an implied covenant or by way of estoppel. The deed
is to be construed as though the parties had mutually covenanted that each should
have a right to butt a dam upon the shore of the other."

By ParolAgreement.-In Tulk v. Ifoxlay (1848), 2 Phil. 774,
it was said, that if there was a mere parol agreement, and no
covenant, the court would enforce it against a party purchas-ing with notice, on the ground that if an equity be attached to
the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of
that equity, can stand in a different situation from the party
from whom he purchased. The agreement may be either
written or oral. Thus, in Tallmadge v. The East River Bank
(1862), 26 N. Y. 105, the owner of lots on both sides of a city
street made a plan exhibiting the street as -widened eight feet
on each side, and represented to several vendees of different
lots that all the buildings to be erected on the lots he had sold
and should sell, should stand -back eight feet from the line of
the street. The vendees erected buildings in conformity with
this plan: none of them being restricted by their conveyances
or bound by any covenant in respect to the extent or mode of
VOL. XXXVIII.--6
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their occupation. An injunction was granted to restrain a
subsequent purchaser of one of the lots, with constructive
notice of the facts, from building upon the eight feet adjoining
the street. The Court said/

"From the facts found by the judge at special term, it appears * * * that the
strips of eight feet in width on both sides of the street should not' be built upon,
but kept open. It is to be presumed that they [the purchasers] would not have
bought and paid their money except upon this assurance. It is to be presumed
that, relying upon this assurance, they paid a larger price for the lots than otherwise they would have paid. Selling and conveying the lots under such circumstances and with such assurances, though verbal, bound Davis [the vendor] in
equity and good conscience to use and dispose of all the remaining lots, so that the
assurances upon which Maxwell [a purchaser and one of the plaintiffs in the suit]
and others had bought their lots, would be kept or fulfilled. This equity attached
to the remaining lots, so that any one subsequently purchasing from Davis any one
or more of the remaining lots, with notice of the equity as between Davis and
Maxwell and others, the prior purchasers, would not stand in a different situation
from Davis, but would be bound by that equity."

To the same effect, Parker v. N'g-htingale (1863), 6 Allen
(Mass.) 341 ; Newman v. Nelis (1884) 97 N. Y. 285 ; Lenning
v. The Ocean City Ass'n (1886), 14 Stew. Eq. (N. J.) 6o6. The
mere exhibition, however, of a plan, with proposed streets and
buildings marked upon it, or representing the land as laid out
in a particular manner, will not create a contract, in the absence of any stipulation affecting the course of improvements:
Squire v. Campbell (1836), I Myl. & Cr. 458. The apparent
conflict between these cases is explained by difference in the
"facts involved. In the New York case, the facts found by the
judge at special term, and the facts admitted by the pleadings,
showed that the lots were bought upon the assurance or agreement of Davis that all the houses on the pln, as shown in
the map, were to be set back eight feet from the street In the
English case, the plan was exhibited upon the treaty for a lease.
The lease as executed, contained on the margin another plan
which did not extend to include that part of the property on
which the injunction, if granted, would operate. In the former case, the evidence established a parol contract collateral
to the grant; in the latter, the affidavits presented tended to
vary the extent and form of the plan as embodied in the lease,
and, in that respect, to alter the terms of the written contract.
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WHEN, IN FAVOR OF, AND AGAINST WHOM, AN EQUITABLE
EASEMENT WILL BE ENFORCED.

The restriction on the use of the property must not amount
to a general restraint of trade; for the law will not permit any
one to restrain a person from doing what his own interest and
the public welfare require that he should do. Any deed, therefore, by which a person binds himself not to employ his talents,
his industry br his capital, in any useful undertaking in the
kingdom, would be void: Homer v. Ashford (1825), 3 Bing.
326; Brewer v. Marshall(1868), 4 C. E. Green (N. J.) 537.
The rule as to what will constitute an illegal contract, as laid
down in the leading case of Mitchellv. Reynolds (1711), I P.
Wms. 18 1, is that where the restraint is not general, but partial,
and is founded on a valuable consideration, it cannot be said to
be an unreasonable restraint; and a restraint preventing a person from carrying on trade within a certain limit of space,
though unlimited as to time, may be good, and the limit of
space may be according to the nature of the trade: Cat v.
Tourle (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 654; Trustees, etc., v. Lynch
(1877), 70 N. Y. 440; Hodge v. Sloan (887), 107 Id. 244;
Wilson v. Hart(1866), L_ R. I Ch. App. 463 ; Luker v. Dennis
(1877), L. R. 7 Ch. D. 227.
Cliange in Characterof Property.-A court of equity will not
enforce a covenant of the character under consideration, where
the complainant has caused or permitted a material change in
the property, for the benefit of which the scheme of restriction
was adopted, nor where, by reason of the altered condition of
the property, it would be oppressive to give effect to the covenant or agreement. This question arises in three classes of
cases: first, where the complainant has himself altered the
condition of the property with respect to which the scheme of
improvement was devised; second, where he has permitted
breaches by other covenantors; and, third,where the condition
of things has been altered by changes referable to the acts of
others. Thus, in Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British
Afuseum, often cited as the British Museum case, (1822), 2 M.
& K. 552, the Duke of Bedford, being the owner of all the
property in the neighborhood of the British Museum, for the
protection of a large part of that property, took a covenant

EQUITABLE EASEMENTS.

from the persons to whom he sold or let other parts of the
property, restricting them from building otherwise than in a
particular way. He afterwards himself built upon a large part
of the property which was originally intended not to be built
upon. In refusing his application for an injunction to restrain
the defendant, being the grantee of the original covenantor
from building in violation of the covenant, the Court said"If this deed is permitted to be urged against what I must call, not the legal, but
the actual intention of the parties, and if you have the means of obtaining any
remedy, you may have recourse to your deed; but you cannot, under such circumstances, come into a court of equity for a remedy which the court never grants,
except in cases where it would be strictly equitable to grant it. It is impossible to
state as the doctrine of a court of equity, that the court will carry into execution a.
specific covenant, in all cases where the legal intention of the deed is found. ** * *
The question is whether, from the altered state of the property, altered by the acts
of the party himself, he has not thereby voluntarily waived and abandoned all that
control which was applicable to the property in its former state."

To the same effect are Sayres v. Collyer (1883), L. R. 24 Ch.
Div. ISo; Lattimer v. Livermore (1878), 72 N. Y. 174.
Where the covenant is framed to provide uniformity in the
mode of building, so that the enjoyment which springs from
regularity in a series of dwelling may be preserved, he who
seeks to enforce the covenant, must suffer no such breach of
the stipulation by other grantees, as will frustrate all the benefit
that would otherwise accrue to the other parties to the agreement. Thus, in Roper v. Williams (1822), I T. & R. 17, the
defendant Williams had conveyed to the plaintiff a piece of
ground, being part of a larger tract, covenanting for himself,
his heirs, appointees and assigns, that all buildings to be erected
on the adjoining land of the grantee should be built in a certain manner. The bill stated that Williams had contracted to
sell, and was about to convey to the defendant, Burnand, part
of the land belonging to him to the west of the plot conveyed
to the plaintiff, without requiring any stipulation that Burnand
should refrain from building houses in a manner not conformable to his covenant, and that Burnand had agreed to let the
land for the erection of houses not in conformity with the
covenant. It appeared by affidavits, that four years previously
another grantee of part of the tract had been permitted to build
in disregard of the restriction. Lord Chancellor ELDON said-
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"Every relaxation which the plaintiff has permitted, in allowing houses to be
built in violation of the covenant, amounts pro tanto to a dispensation of the obligation intended to be contracted by it. Very little, in cases of this nature, is sufficient to show acquiescence; and courts of equity will not interfere unless the m6st
active diligence has been exerted throughout the whole proceeding. * * * * In
every case of this sort, the party injured is bound to make immediate application to
the court in the first instance; and cannot permit money to be expended by a person, even though he has notice of the covenant, and then apply for an injunction.
Taking all the circumstances together, the permission to build contrary to the covenant, and the laying by, four or five months, before filing the bill, this is not a case
in which a court of equity ought to interfere by injunction, but the plaintiff must be
left to his remedy at law."

So, also, Peek v. Afatthews (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 515 ; Gaskin
v. Balls (1879), L. R. i3 Ch. Div. 324; Eastwood v. Lever
(1863), 4 DeG. J. & S. 114; Child v. Douglass (i854), 5 DeG.
M. & G. 739The waiver relied upon, must be in respect of a material violation of the covenant. In German v. Chapman (1877), L. R.
7 Ch. Div. 271, the law is recognized to be, as stated in Roper
v. Williams, that"If there is a general scheme for the benefit of a great number of persons, and
then, either by permission or acquiescence, or by a long chain of things, the property has been either entirely, or so substantially changed, as that the whole character of the place or neighborhood has been altered, so that the whole object for
which the covenant was originally entered into, must be considered to be at an
end, then the covenantee is not allowed to come into the court for the purpose
merely of harassing and annoying some particular man, where the court could see
he was not doing it bonafide, for the purpose of effecting the object for which the
covenant was originally entered into."

The Court (in German v. Chapman) then proceeded"That is very different from the case we have before us, where the plaintiff says
that in one particular spot, far away from this place, and not interfering at all with
the general scheme, he has, uider particular circumstances, allowed a waiver of the
covenant. I think it would be a monstrous thing to say that nobody could do an
act of kindness, or that any vendor of an estate, who had taken covenants of this
kind from several persons, could not do an act of kindness, or from any motive
whatever, relax in any single instance any of these covenants, without destroying
the whole effect of the stipulations which other people had entered into with him.
For instance, in this very case, application was made to the plaintiff for a waiver.
It would be monstrous to suppose, if he had acceded to that application, that therefore he was, by the mere act of kindness to the defendants themselves, destroying
the whole benefit of the covenants as to all the rest of the estate."

The same ruling in Western v. Macdermott (1866), L. R. I
Eq. 499, s. c. affirmed on appeal (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. App. 72;
Kentv. Sober (i85i), i Sim. N. S 517.
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Where a contingency has happened, not within the contemplation of the parties, which imposes upon the property a
condition frustrating the scheme dvised by them, and defeating the object of the covenant, thus rendering its enforcement
oppressive and inequitable, a court of equity will not decree
such enforcement. In Tntstees of Columbia College v. Thatcher
(1881), 87 N. Y. 311, the covenant was not to erect, establish
or carry on in any manner, on any part of the said lands, any
stable, school-house, engine house, tenement or community
house, or any kind of manufactory, trade or business whatsoever, or erect or build, or commence to erect or build, any
building or edifice with intent to use the same, or any
part thereof, for any of the purposes aforesaid. The breaches
relied on by the plaintiff were that the defendant permitted
the use of the several rooms in the houses upon the premises
by his tenants, for the business of a tailor, milliner, insurance
agent, newspaper dealer, tobacconist and two express carriers.
It also appeared that the general current of business had
reached and passed the premises, and that during the pendency
of the action, an elevated railroad was built with a station in
front of such premises, which the trial court found affected
them injuriously, and rendered them less -profitable for the
purpose of a dwelling house, but did not render their use for
business purposes indispensable. The evidence also disclosed
that the station covered a portion of the street, its platform
occupied half the width of the sidewalk in front of defendant's
premises, and from it persons could look directly into the
windows, and that this, with the noise of the trains, rendered
privacy and quiet impossible, so that large depreciations in
rents and frequent vacations followed the construction of the
road. Mr. Justice DANFORTH, speaking for the Court, said:
"It is now claimed by the appellant that there has been such an entire change
in the character of the neighborhood of the premises, as to defeat the object and
purpose of the agreement, and that it would be inequitable to deprive the defendant
of the privileges of conforming his property to that character, so that he could use
it to his greater advantage, and in no respect to the detriment of the plaintiff. The
agreement before us recites, that the object which the parties to the covenant haa.
in view was 'to provide for the better improvement of the lands, and to secure
their permanent value.' It certainly is not the doctrine of courts of equity to
enforce, by its peculiar mandate, every contract, in all cases, even where specific
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execution is found to be its legal intention and effect. It gives or withholds such
decree, according to its discretion, in view of the circumstances of the case, and
the plaintiff's prayer for relief is not answered, where, under those circumstances,
the ,relief he seeks would be inequitable. * ** * If for any reasons, therefore,
not referable to the defendant, an enforcement of the covenant would defeat either
of the ends contemplated by the parties, a court of equity might well refuse to interfere; or if in fact the condition of the property by which the premises are surrounded, has been so altered ' that the terms and restrictions' of the covenant are
no longer applicable to the existing state of things. * * * * And so, though the
contract was fair and just when made, the interference of the court should be
denied, if subsequent events have made performance by the defendant so onerous,
that its enforcement would impose great hardship upon him and cause little or no
benefit to the plaintiff. * * * * In the case before us, the plaintiffs rely upon no
circumstance of equity, but put their claim to relief upon the covenant and the
violation of its conditions by the defendant. They have established, by their complaint and proof, a clear legal cause of action. If damages have been sustained,
they must, in any proper action, be allowed. But, on the other hand, the defendant has exhibited such change in the condition of the adjacent property, and its
character for use, as leaves no ground for equitable interference, if the discretion
of the court is to be governed by the principles I have stated, or the cases which
those principles have controlled."

See also the dictum above quoted (page 85) from Roper v.
Williams (I822), I T. & R. 17.
Object of Restriction.-It must also appear, either from the
terms of the agreement, from' the circumstances in which it
originated, or the situation and condition of the property, that
the restriction was intended to benefit that property, and not
merely for the personal advantage of the original covenantee:
Keates v. Lyon (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 218; Parkerv. Nightingale (1863), 6 Allen (Mass.) 341; Peck v. Conway (I876),
I19 Mass. 546; Shatp v.Ropes (1872), 1IO Id. 381 ; Clarkv.
Martin (1865), 49 Pa. 289; Tod-Heatly v. Benham (1888), L.
R. 4o Ch. Div. 8o. In Nottingham Patent B rick and Tile Company v. Butler (I886), 16 Q. B. D. 778, LINDLEY, L. J., stated
the law to be as decided in Harrisonv. Good (1871), L. R. 1I
Eq. 338, "that it is an inference of fact in each case, whether
the purchasers are bound interse by such covenants, and that
the mere fact that the vendor does not bind himself expressly
to enforce the covenants which he takes for the benefit of the
purchasers, is not material." It is the community of interest
in the beneficial restriction which necessarily requires and
imports reciprocity of obligation. This in Renals v. Cowlishaw
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(1878), L. R. 9 Ch. D. 125, the former owners in fee of a residential estate and adjoining lands, sold part of the adjoining
lands to the defendant's predecessors in title, who entered into
a covenant to build upon the land thereby conveyed, within a
certain distance from a particular road; that the garden walls
or palisades to be set up along the sides of the said road
should stand back a certain distance from the centre of the
road; that any house to be built upon the land adjoining the
road, should be of a certain value, and of an elevation at least
equal to that of the houses on a particular road; and that no
trade or business should be carried on in any of such houses
or buildings, but that the same should be used as private
dwelling houses only. The conveyance did not state that this
covenant was for the protection of the residential property, or
in reference to the adjoining pieces of land, or make any statement or reference thereto. Other pieces of the adjoining
lands were subsequently sold, and the conveyance to the purchaser in each case contained restrictive covenants similar to
that above mentioned. The same vendors afterwards sold the
residential estate to the plaintiffs' predecessors in title. The
conveyances contained no reference to the restrictive covenants, nor was there any contract or representation that the
purchasers of the residential estate were to have the benefit of
them; there was, moreover, in the conveyance to the plaintiffs, a covenant not to build a public house or carry on offensive trades upon a particular portion of the property conveyed,
thus limiting their use of the purchased property, but not coextensively with those covenants first given. Vice Chancellor
HALL dismissed a bill to restrain the defendants from building
in contravention of the first mentioned covenants. In his
judgment he said:
"' From the cases * * * it may, I think, be considered as determined, that any
one who has acquired land, being one of several lots laid out for sale as building
plots, where the court is satisfied that it was the intention that each one of the
several purchasers should be bound by, and should, as against the others, have the
benefit of the covenants entered into by each of the purchasers, is entitled to the
benefit of the covenant; and that the right, that is, the benefit of the covenant,
enures to the assign of the first purchaser, in other words, runs with the land of
such purchaser. This right exists not only where the several parties execute a
mutual deed of covenant, but where a mutual contract can be sufficiently estab-
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lished. A purchaser may also be entitled to the beneft of a restrictive covenant
entered into with his vendor by another or others where his vendor has contracted
with him that he shall be the assign of it, that is, have the benefit of the covenant.
And such covenant need not be express, but may be collected from the transaction of sale and purchase. In considering this, the expressed or otherwise apparent purpose or object of the covenant, in reference to its being intended to be
.annexed to other property, or to its being only obtained to enable the covenantee
more advantageously to deal with his property, is important to be attended to.
*Whether the purchaser is the purchaser of all the land retained by his vendor
-when the covenant was entered into, is also important. If he is not, it may be
important to take into consideration whether his vendor has sold off part of the
land so retained, and if he has done so, whether or not he has so sold subject to a
-similar covenant; whether the purchaser claiming the benefit of the covenant has
.entered into a similar covenant may not be so important."

The Vice Chancellor, being satisfied that the restrictive
covenant was not inserted for the benefit of the particular property, but to enable the vendors to make the most of the property they retained, refused to order an injunction. This
,decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in (1879), L. R.
[I Ch. Div. 866, and cited with emphatic approval in Spicerv.
a1artin (1888), L. R. 14 App. Cas. 12; Master v. Hansard
'(1876), L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 718 ; Badger v. Boardman (I86o), I6
Gray (Mass.) 559; Tobey v. Moore (i88i), 130 Mass. 448;
Thurston v. Mike (1870), 32 Md. 487. And where the restrictions are made for the benefit of the property, and enure
in favor of the persons who become the respective owners of
it, the original covenantee cannot by release discharge any part
•of it except such as he still retains: Raynor v. Lyon (1887), 46
Hun. (N. Y.) 227.

Title to land within the tract, for the common .benefit of
which the easement is created, is the only other requisite to support a prayer for an injunction to restrain a violation of the covenant by any proprietor. As restrictions of this nature are intended for the mutual protection of all the proprietors, neither
privity of contract nor privity of estate is essential, and a prior
may have a remedy against a subsequent purchaser of part of
the same tract, even when a parol representation of a uniform
building plan is the sole evidence of the contract: Tobey v.
.Afoore (I8i), 130 Mass., 448; Talmadge v. The East River
Bank (1862) 26 N. Y. 1O5 ; Gibert v. Peteler (1868), 38 Id.
165; Green v. Creighton (186 ),7 R. I. I.
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It is necessary that the defendant purchase with full notice
of the agreement. It is binding upon him, not because he
stands as assignee of the party who made the agreement, but
because he has taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement concerning it, which he cannot equitably refuse to perform: Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. (1858), II Gray (Mass.) 359;
Phcenix ns. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. (I882), 87 N. Y. 400.
And slight circumstances will be construed as equivalent to
notice of the existence of the equity. Thus, in Tallnadge v.
The EastRiver Bank, cited above, the uniformity in the position of houses erected in the immediate neighborhood, in conformity with a general building plan, was held to be sufficient
to put the purchaser on inquiry and charge him with notice.
Similarly, Salisbury v. Andrews (I88O), 128 Mass. 336; Morland v. Cook (I868), L. R. 6 Eq. 252.
EQUITABLE REMEDIES.

It remains only to consider what will amount to a violation
of an equitable easement, and the remedy which a court of
equity will apply. The owner of the servient tenement can
do no act on his land which interferes substantially with the
easement, or with those rights which are requisite to the full
enjoyment of its benefits; but the utmost extent of the duty
which rests on the owner of the servient tenement, is not to
alter its condition so as to interfere with the enjoyment of the
easement: Gal. & What. on Ease't. 7, 339; Kirkpatrick v.
Peshine (1873), 9 C. E. Green (N. J.) 206; Johnston v. Hyde
(I88I), 6 Stew. Eq. (N. J.) 632. The extent to which the
owner of the servient tenement is interdicted from the exercise
of acts of ownership on his lands, will depend on the nature
and qualities of the easement: Atkins v. Bordnan (1841), 2
Metc. (Mass.) 457. Where a penalty or forfeiture is annexed
to the doing of the act prohibited, this penalty does *not
authorize the party to do the act, and before the act is done,
the Court will restrain him by injunction, unless it appears
from a fair construction of the instrument that it was intended
to make the stipulated sum the price of non-performance; but
if the act is done the penalty must be paid, and the amount is
unimportant: Frenck v. Afacale (842), 2 Dru. & War. 269;
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Coles v. Sims (1854), 5 DeG. M. & G. I ; The Phwnix Ins. Ca.
v. The ContinentalIns. Co. (1882), 87 N. Y. 4oo; The Diamond
Malch Co. v. Roeber (1887), io6 Id. 473; Natonal Provincial Bank of Englandv. Marshall (I888), L. R. 40 Ch. D. 112.
Nor is it necessary to show that any damage has been done.
A covenantee has the right to have the actual enjoyment of
the property, nodo et forma, as stipulated for by him. The
mere fact that a breach of the covenant is intended, is a sufficient ground for the interference of the court by injunction:
Zirkpatrickv. Peshine (1873), 9 C. E. Green (N. J.) 206.
The usual and proper equitable remedy for a breach of a
negative covenant or agreement, is an injunction. This will
be awarded as of course, upon proof of the complainant's
right and its violation by the defendant. In some cases, the
court will import a negative quality into the covenant, and
enforce the right by injunction: Kerr's Injunctions in Equity,
521; Vewman v. Nellis (884), 97 N. Y. 285. Thus, in the
English brewers' leases, covenants are usually inserted stipulating for the purchase from the lessor of all the beer consumed at the public house demised. Such rights will be protected by injunction, against assignees with notice, even where
they extend to other public houses held by the same lessees
under other landlords : Luker v.Dennis (1877), L. R. 7 Ch. Div.
227; Catt v. Tourle (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 654. The ground
of decision is, that the grant of an exclusive right of this
description, contained in a covenant, is equivalent to a negative
covenant, and -the cases are thus brought under the operation
of the rule in Lumley v. Wagner (1852), I D. M. & G. 604, that
wherever a court of equity has not proper jurisdiction to enforce specific performance, it operates to bind men's consciences,
so far as they can be bound, to a true and literal performance
of their agreements, and will not suffer them to depart from
their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party with whom
they have contracted to the mere chance of any damages which
a jury.may give. By thus importing a negative quality into
an affirmative covenant, the courts have assumed to enforce
agreements of which specific performance could not be decreed:
Cooke v. Chilcott (1876), L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 694. The propriety
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and extent of this exercise of jurisdiction it is not within the
scope of the present article to examine.
Where interference with the easement is merely
threatened,
the preventative remedy by injunction is always adequate to
the exigencies of the case; but if there has been an actual interference, a mandatory injunction may become necessary to
supplement the usual remedy. The power of the court to
grant such relief, though once questioned, is now admitted
beyond doubt. In Rankin v. Huskisson (830), 4 Sim. 13, the
agreement was that no buildings should be erected on the plot
of ground, south of the demised premises. The complainants
built thereon, and afterwards the defendants began to erect
stables on the adjoining land. Vice-Chancellor SHADWELL
awarded an injunction restraining the defendants, not only
from continuing the projected buildings, or commencing any
other buildings whatever, on the plot of ground described in
the pleadings, or any part thereof, but also from permitting
such part of said building as had been already erected to remain
thereon. See note (i) to Rankin v. Huskisson; Kerr on Injunc., 231. The extreme limit of this jurisdiction, however, is
the restoration of the property to its condition at the time the
wrongful act or neglect began.
As has been said, specific performance of a proper covenant
to perform positive acts, will be decreed, if the covenant is one
which runs with the land, or if the bill is filed against the
original covenantor. What are proper covenants under this
head of equitable jurisdiction is a question to be determined
solely under the rules regulating the granting of that kind of
relief. It is unnecessary to discuss its limitations here.
SHERRERD
Newark, New Jersey.
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